Deep Dive Intermediate 12 min
Lessons from Counterparty Failures: SVB, Credit Suisse & Argentex
By Gearóid Keegan · Published 7 August 2026
Investment & Counterparty Risk · Hedj Treasury Insights
Very few things bring about the same level of schadenfreude in financial circles as a good financial collapse. The gossip on Bloomberg…the race to be the first one with the inside story… tutting at the poor risk management and obvious mistakes… speculating on outcome collapse, bail-out or who will ride in to save the day…and of course trying to make a quick profit picking up assets at fire-sale prices. That's as long as you're not exposed or at risk of contagion of course.
Markets have not left us wanting in recent years. We look at three collapses in three consecutive years. Three different institutions, three different customers bases. Different causes and different lessons.
A US bank that died of interest rate risk and concentration in 48 hours.
A globally systemic Swiss bank whose end taught bondholders about fine print.
A London-listed FX broker whose margin calls and risk appetite became its clients' problem inside a week.
Together they form a short, expensive syllabus in counterparty risk.
Case study
SVB, March 2023: speed is the new variable
Markets were aware of SVB's issues for a long time, but when it finally collapsed, it happened fast.
Background: Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) was a specialist bank with a 40-year track record supporting tech firms, start-ups, Venture Capital and Private Equity firms. They were a major beneficiary of the extraordinary growth in Tech, life sciences and VC industries that coincided with the Covid pandemic.
At their peak, they counted half of US venture backed tech and life sciences companies as their customers and were a top-20 US bank.
Cause: Their collapse was a result of a number of factors;
Interest rate/Duration risk.
They had large cash balances from their customer base (funded start-ups, VCs and PE firms, and profitable tech & life-sciences) and tried to squeeze returns in a low-interest rate environment.
They did this by investing largely in longer term US treasuries and other high quality agency bonds. Securing a 1-1.5% annual pick-up on their investments (2y vs 10y treasuries).
While invested in high quality assets, they ignored the interest rate risk associated with longer term instruments.
10y yields rose from 0.50% in mid-2020 to 1.5% in Dec 2021. A year later they were 2% higher. This rapid rise in longer term rates translated into sharp devaluation of longer-term investments.
A $100 of 10-year bonds bought in Dec 2020 was worth 25% less 2 years later.
SVB's investment portfolio was ~$120bn.
Sharp rise in long term treasury yields resulted in sharp fall in value of SVB investment portfolio
Customer concentration.
As interest rates started to rise (mid-2022). VC funding levels fell sharply.
SVB customers started burning through cash, and deposits started falling.
Highly connected tech savvy customers.
As a bank servicing start-ups, SVB boasted a modern banking platform giving users the ability to instruct payments and move money via mobile apps.
Founders and VCs are also an incredibly interconnected ecosystem and transmission of information is incredibly quick.
SVB was the first bank to experience a run in the modern age, where the combination of speed of transmission of information and instant access to withdraw funds overwhelmed their ability to generate liquidity and accelerated their collapse.
Timeline:
Date
What happened
08/03/2023
SVB announce sale of $21bn of securities and announce plans to raise capital to shore up liquidity. The announcement backfires as markets calculate the sales crystallises a $1.8bn loss.
09/03/2023
Customers withdraw $42bn in one day, and instruct a further $100bn in withdrawals for the following day.
10/03/2023
SVB can't meet withdrawals and California regulators shutter the bank and the FDIC takes control.
Resolution: FDIC took control of the bank on 10 March 2023 to prevent systemic collapse.
Outcome:
37,000 depositors received full access to their funds after deposit guarantee was extended and deposits were eventually transferred to First Citizens Banks.
Bondholders and other unsecured creditors of the holding company are expected to recover a significant portion of their exposure due to the high-quality loan portfolio and recovery of the investment portfolio.
Common and preferential shareholders were essentially written down to zero.
Lessons:
Your response plan must work at deposit-app speed, which means the second banking relationship exists, is funded, and has been tested before you need it.
Understand the risks when you are investing. Treasury bonds are safe, everyone says so, but they obey the rules of market pricing.
Case study
Credit Suisse, March 2023: don't ignore the signals
Credit Suisse decline was long-running and slow, but even at the very end, shareholders came away with something
Background: Founded in 1856, one of the two cornerstones of the Swiss financial system, and one of the largest global investment banks and wealth managers, Credit Suisse (CS) collapse was the largest and most shocking since the global financial crisis. At one stage they had over CHF1.3trillion of Assets Under Management, and 1.5mn customers globally.
Cause: Death by 1,000 scandals, fines and risk management failures. There wasn't a single or even a handful of drivers behind the collapse of CS. In fact, whenever a list of major banks was associated with bad investments, regulatory failure or major litigation CS were almost inevitably involved.
Timeline:
In 2021 they were hit by a number of scandals in quick succession;
Tuna bonds - the main financier in a corrupt and fraudulent state-guaranteed fundraising that crashed the economy of Mozambique and lead to hundreds of millions of fines for CS.
Greensill collapse - Funds managed by CS related to UK supply-chain lender Greensill collapsed, raising serious questions about risk management and governance controls.
Archegos - CS suffered a $5bn loss as one of the largest banks exposed to Bill Hwang's Archegos. It was later discovered that exposure had reached $24bn, more than half of CS's capital.
These scandals dent customer confidence and kick off a persistent outflow of customer funds from depositors and wealth management customers.
Q4 2022 - the bank reports a massive quarterly loss of CHF 1.4bn, bringing losses for the year to CHF 7.3bn. Share price falls sharply, and customer outflows grow.
10 March 2023 - SVB collapse heightens concerns about other banks facing liquidity risk. CS is high on the list.
15 March 2023 - CS' largest shareholder, the Saudi National bank, says they will not commit additional capital. Share price collapses.
16 March 2023 - The Swiss National Bank (SNB) steps in to provide CS with up to CHF 50bn of liquidity support.
Resolution: 17-19th March SNB negotiated a (forced) emergency take-over of CS by their largest Swiss rival UBS.
Outcome:
Depositors and senior unsecured creditors survived intact.
Equity shareholders received the equivalent of CHF 0.76 per share of UBS stock in the rescue. A significant haircut (~50%) on the last traded price, but not a complete write-down some expected.
AT1 bondholders - holders of contingent capital were written down to zero in a move that widely shocked markets. The bonds were expected to convert to equity, as most European bank programmes are designed to do, but the SNB invoked extraordinary powers to declare a "viability event", writing the value of the bonds to zero and causing European investors to run to their prospectuses.
Lessons:
Ratings move at committee pace, markets work off instinct. When they disagree, believe the prices enough to shorten your exposure while you investigate.
Credit default spreads spiked up to 1,400 bps immediately prior to the collapse, but had been trending higher for months
Apart from losing close to 90% of its share price in the years before it collapsed, CS was involved in a string of compliance and risk management failures, investment scandals and trading losses. The signs were there for anyone paying attention.
Where you sit in an institution's structure (depositor, senior creditor, bondholder, derivative counterparty under an ISDA) determines your outcome more than the institution's brand does.
Don't make assumptions about your investment risk, read the documentation.
Case study
Argentex, April 2025: your counterparty's risk management is your risk
Small investor base and limited news coverage meant Argentex share-price didn't give much away before it collapsed
Background: Argentex was a specialist FX and payments provider founded in the UK in 2012. They focused on SME and Mid-market corporates, and initially enjoyed strong growth both in the UK, and later Europe. They listed on the AIM index in 2019, and by 2022 had a market cap of almost £200mn, and almost 8,000 corporate clients.
Cause: There was no single cause of Argentex' collapse, other than general risk management failure. It was a number of separate cracks which combined when markets moved sharply.
Sharp market moves - The catalyst was the EUR/USD move (c. 15% higher). Sharp and unexpected, no-one can be blamed for not anticipating the US tariff announcement. But if you claim your business is risk management…
EURUSD rose sharply in Q1 '25 and further still in Q2. Argentex' EUR/USD positions suffered significant margin calls.
Client concentration - Argentex (and many other brokers) had built up outsized trade portfolios of dollar buyers vs other portions of the book. There are a number of reasons for this;
Panic hedging as EURUSD approached parity at the start of the year.
Structure of small/mid-market in Europe (more importers paying in USD, mostly from China, than there are exporters to the US).
Ability to generate higher revenue from USD buyers due the shape of the forward curve (forward rates more favourable for USD buyers).
Inadequate liquidity. Back of a cigarette packet maths (market moves of 4-5% leading to margin outflows of c. £20mn in both April and May) suggests Argentex had a net long dollar position (i.e. more customers buying USD than selling USD) of close to £500mn. In itself this isn't a big number, but it is a big number to sit on with less than £20mn of available net cash, as Argentex's Dec 2024 accounts showed. Any reasonable stress testing should have stressed EURUSD & GBPUSD more than 5%, as both pairs have experienced multiple 5-10% moves in recent years.
High risk products and offering. Argentex' own directors specifically mentioned two elements of their offering which contributed to their collapse;
"Zero-zero" facilities. These are facilities where clients are not required to post money at the initiation of a trade (Initial margin or IM), but also not required to post margin if the value of a trade falls significantly (Variation margin or VM). The knock-on result was that when Argentex's liquidity providers called them for margin, they were unable to make similar calls to their own clients to fund the payments.
TARFs - Target Redemption Forwards. Speculative trades that often carry higher leverage so that clients are obliged to buy more currency as the rate moves against them. The impact of this leverage would have been an increase in long dollar exposure as Argentex were already struggling to meet margin calls. These trades were often written on zero-zero lines, magnifying the potential liquidity risk.
Timeline:
Date
What happened
02/04/2025
"Liberation Day" tariff announcements shock market and send EURUSD sharply higher.
18/04/2025
Argentex board commence an emergency sale process when they realise they would be insolvent within a week.
23/04/2025
After entertaining approaches from IFX, Lumon/Pollen Street Capital and former founder Harry Adams. They accept an offer in principle from Pollen Street Capital.
24/04/2025
Offer from Pollen is withdrawn shortly after midnight. They re-engage with IFX and agree a £3mn offer and package of immediate financial support. IFX provide a £6.5mn bridging facility to shore up liquidity.
30/04/2025
IFX provide a further £4mn bridging loan.
06/05/2025
IFX provide a further £20mn revolving credit facility to allow Argentex to meet future margin calls.
08/07/2025
RCF is increased to £26.5mn with £23.5mn drawn. FCA imposes stricter conditions including higher liquidity standards on the group.
Resolution: Ongoing. Argentex entered Administration on 21 July with creditors of around £113mn. IFX formally terminated the acquisition agreement on 7th August, becoming a secured creditor (Argentex's single largest creditor, having poured in over £34mn).
Outcome:
Segregated accounts weren't covered by the FSCS deposit guarantee scheme but they were protected from Argentex' creditors, however, after the collapse, the Administrators did levy charges on the funds to cover the cost of the resolution process, meaning funds were not only locked up for a considerable amount of time, but also were not fully recovered.
Thousands of FX derivatives counterparties had trades frozen or positions closed out and mark-to-markets crystallised. Those with in the money positions were amongst the worst affected, with write-downs of up to 98% reported on profitable trades.
Lessons:
A counterparty can fail on its own book while yours is fine, so due diligence extends to how the provider manages its risk, not just yours.
If terms are too good-to-be-true be cautious. Zero-zero lines are attractive, but they add considerable liquidity risk to the provider. If someone offers them, you should validate that they have the liquidity resources to back them up.
Continuity: replacing a hedging and payments provider mid-programme takes weeks at best, so the concentration question includes how fast could we switch, and should be asked before you need an answer.
Deposits and loans are not the only source of credit risk. Both in-the-money trades, and margin payments against out-of-the-money trades can create credit exposure in an insolvency.
Rescues aren't always to be celebrated. IFX started out as a Knight in Shining Armour with a £3mn offer to acquire Argentex and take-over their book. They pumped in over £30mn more to keep Argentex on life-support, but in the end could not do enough. They ended up owed £35mn and sitting ahead of unsecured creditors. Regular creditors might have been better off if Argentex had been allowed to fail earlier.
The checklist the three cases write together
Aggregate exposure per name across deposits, hedge mark-to-market and operational balances.
Diversify to the point where any single failure is an inconvenience, not an event. Watch market signals, and act on divergence from ratings.
Know where you rank as a creditor in every exposure you hold, and remember different exposures to the same counterparty may be treated differently.
Ask every provider, bank or non-bank, how they manage their own risk, and treat a vague answer as data.
Have a back-up and rehearse the switch.
The week these things happen is the wrong week to learn your alternatives.
The same job at three sizes
Start-up. SVB was substantially a start-up story: single-bank concentration as the default setting of an entire ecosystem, corrected in one panicked weekend. … read more show less
There is now a standard solution, a second bank account, and money-market funds for large balances.
Established mid-market. Argentex is the mid-market's case: non-bank providers are often the best-value route for FX and payments, and diligence on their own risk management is the price of using them well. … read more show less
Ask the right questions, a good provider will answer them readily. Be cautious when credit terms or products seem too good to be true.
Large corporate. CS is the sophisticated case: complex instruments and structures carry risk that brand names obscure. … read more show less
The fine print on seniority was public all along; someone has to be paid to have read it.
Where Hedj fits
Hedj's reporting keeps the per-name aggregate information current, which is the first line of the checklist. On the Argentex lesson we'll answer our own question: where credit risk is a factor, we partner with strong, high-quality institutions, and are happy to discuss how client funds are protected and what happens to client positions in stress. We also provide access to diversified deposit counterparties and investments assisting diversification without the hassle of enduring multiple onboarding processes.
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